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Out of the mouth of babes and sucklings hast thou ordained
strength, because of thine enemies, that thou mightest still the
enemy and the avenger.
- Psalm 8:2-31
Kids say the darndest things.
- Art Linkletter
2
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1 Psalms 8:2 (King James).
2 From the "House Party" television series, 1952 1968 and 1968 1969.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Akiane Kramarik, age fifteen at the time of this writing, is an accom-
plished artist and poet, earning appearances on programs such as "Oprah Winf-
rey" because of her prodigious talent. At the age of four, she began to draw, and
by the age of six, she was painting. She painted some of her earliest commer-
cial works by age seven.4 She works four to five hours each day painting, often
rising before five in the morning to begin.' Born to a professional-chef father
and a stay-at-home mother, Akiane now paints eight to twenty paintings a year,
which sell for anywhere from $50,000.00 to $1,000,000.00 apiece.6 In addition,
she has written and published two books of poetry. Her teenage brothers oper-
ate a web site (www.artakiane.com) dedicated to Akiane and her works, and on
that site, consumers can purchase her books and artwork. The web site bears the
copyright notice, "All Material on this site is © Copyright 2000-2008 Akiane
Kramarik." 8 She only has one federally registered copyright, co-owned with her
mother, Foreli, for the book Akiane - Her Life, Her Art, Her Poetry.9 Her
brothers do not have a copyright registration in the web site.
Like Akiane and her brothers, thousands upon thousands of "underage
authors" are exposing their copyrighted works online. But what rights, exactly,
are they securing for themselves? In theory, the Copyright Act could protect
against the misappropriation of the young author's rights, but only if that author
thinks to register his or her work. The minor author is often all too willing to
expose the work to infringement by publishing or even creating the copyrighta-
ble work online, inviting right-click instantaneous copying of the work. Distri-
bution of copyrighted works can occur before the author has even realized that a
work has been created, thanks to social networking sites that target teens and
tweens as young as age six. In addition, each of these sites has complex user
3 See Akiane: Her Life, http://www.artakiane.com/her life.html (last visited June 4, 2008)
(hereinafter "Akiane"). It is the author's understanding that the information on the web site has
not been updated since February 2008. so any factual information provided here is subject to that
limitation.
4 See Akiane, http://www.artakiane.com/home.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2009).
5 See id.
6 See id.; see also Akiane: Questions and Answers,
http://www.artakiane.com/questions-answers.htm (last visited June 4. 2008). Limited and open
edition giclees are available for $450.00 to $10.000.00 a piece. Id.
7 AKIANE KRAMARIK, AKIANE - HER LIFE, HER ART, HER POETRY (2006); AKIANE
KRAMARIK, MY DREAM is BIGGER THAN I MEMORIES OF TOMORROW (ARTAKIANE LLC 2006).
8 See Akiane, supra note 4.
9 U.S. Copyright Reg. No. TX0006466698 (registered Nov. 9, 2006), available at
http://cocatalog.loc.gov/cgibin/Pwebrecon.cgi?Search Arg TX0006466698&SearchCode REG
S&PID=dhaqyVBADIE9HIGpB4BADvTJax 18F&SEQ=20091013114256&CNT=25&HIST =I 1.
U0 See, e.g.. Gina Chen. Making Sense of Social-Networking Sites for Young Kids, SYRACUSE
POST-STANDARD, Dec. 29, 2008. http://blog.syracuse.com/family/2008/12/makingsense of
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agreements and terms of use that could confuse someone who is thirty-eight,
much less eight. These terms, which many users never acknowledge or see,
purport to be contractual agreements that bind the user regardless of that user's
age.
Or do they? In theory, the age-old contractual doctrine of infancy"1
the principle that contracts are voidable at the election of a contracting minor1
2
- protects the minor from malevolent contractual predators who would take
advantage of a naYve child. In this respect, the doctrine may be used as a defen-
sive shield for the child to negate a contract that the minor in an older, wiser
stage of life (often by only months) may regret. An infant may raise this de-
fense in litigation when an adult plaintiff seeks to uphold the agreed-upon terms
when the minor defendant lacked the capacity to agree. 13 Used in this manner,
the infancy defense is often all but guaranteed. Conversely, as a longstanding
rule, the infancy doctrine may not be used as a sword, allowing minors to pick
and choose the contracts he would disaffirm. 14 In other words, an infant plain-
tiff has no recourse from the doctrine when attempting proactively to avoid a
contract that might impinge upon that plaintiffs rights. As a result, because of
its reliability as a defense but its impracticability as a cause of action, the infan-
cy doctrine is structured in a way that makes it nearly impossible for a plaintiff
to succeed in an infancy-related dispute. It is no surprise, then, that the doctrine
of infancy has always had its share of critics, and, like their historic counter-
parts, recent authors have called for its abolition.
Online contracts, however, may present an instance where the doctrine
of infancy should not be abolished or even limited, but perhaps should be ex-
panded so that minor authors who post materials on a web site can protect the
rights in those works from unwitting dilution. Online click-through agreements
often contain licenses to the young authors' copyrighted works, but authors who
could be protected by the doctrine of infancy habitually are aware neither of the
rights they have obtained in the work nor of the license granted merely by the
child's navigation through a colorful site. Assuming the child obtains access
without the assistance of a parent, he could be bound to pages of legal jargon,
socialnetworki.html. Ms. Chen reviews six social networking sites aimed at minors, three of
which (ClubPenguin.com, Nicktropolis.com, and Webkinz.com) list ages as young as six as ac-
ceptable for the site.
11 Formation of contracts requires that the contracting parties have the capacity to do so, and
this capacity is presumed "unless he falls within one of the classes of persons who are held by the
law to have no capacity, or only a limited capacity to contract." Infants comprise one of these
classes. See 5 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 9:1, at 2 (4th ed. 2009).
12 [Book I] E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 443 (3d ed., Aspen Publish-
ers 2004).
13 For purposes of this Article, the terms "infant," "child," "minor," and "underage" signify a
person who is under the age of majority, typically age eighteen years, in his or her jurisdiction.
14 See, e.g.. Lemon v. Beeman, 45 Ohio St. 505. 509 (Ohio 1888) ("[T]he general doctrine of
rescission is departed from no further than is necessary to preserve the grounds upon which the
privilege is allowed: and is governed by the maxim that infancy is a shield, and not a sword.").
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even though the web site may target children who possess a vocabulary com-
prising of little more than monosyllabic words. 
1 5
Granted, the hypothetical situation of an exploited six-year-old author
held to the terms of an overly legalized adult contract may sound a little ex-
treme. The erosion of the doctrine of infancy and of the rights that infant au-
thors may have in copyrighted works would not begin in such a case, but in a
case such as A. V v. iParadigms.16 In iParadigms, the author was an older in-
fant, bound by terms and conditions of a web site to which he was forced to
publish as part of a high school class in order to receive a passing grade.1 7 In
this case involving the popular plagiarism-checking software Turnitin, the court
created an opinion that not only had immediate analytical impact for the con-
tractual doctrine of infancy, but also had a more subtle, lasting impact on how
courts are to interpret the terms and conditions of sites. And, as a result, the
problems that are highlighted by the failure to apply the doctrine to online con-
tracts, as well as the failure to protect infant authors, may eventually change
how web site terms and conditions, user agreements, and click-wrap licenses
will ultimately be viewed and created.
This Article begins by examining the practical ability or inability of the
"infant author" to achieve and exploit the full rights of copyright, given that the
Copyright Office itself seems to recognize that any rights given to infant authors
are tempered by contract laws. Section II reviews the contractual doctrine of
infancy and its effect upon a child author's protection under copyright law.
Section III examines the specific problem of minors contracting regarding their
copyrights, especially online contracts. Section IV explores the issue as current-
ly framed, reviewing potential solutions already suggested and noting their inhe-
rent problems. Section V examines the recent decision, A. V. v. iParadigms,
concerning child authors and noting potential flaws in the district court's ratio-
nale. Section VI explores some of these problems, including constitutional
rights that support the creative process but which may be limited in a child's
setting, and suggests a measure that Congress could take to ensure that these
15 ReadingKEY, a vocabulary-building program for grades one through five, identifies fewer
than three dozen polysyllabic words over a thirty-six week first-grade course (ten words per
week), of which only three are more than two syllables: "together," "tomorrow," and "beautiful."
See TampaReads, Grade I National Reading Vocabulary, http://www.tampareads.com/worksheet/
start.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2009). The first sentence of ClubPenguin.com, by comparison,
contains as many polysyllabic words as monosyllabic words, including three four-syllable words
("Welcome to Club Penguin (the 'Site'). Club Penguin is operated and presented to users by Club
Penguin Entertainment Inc. of Kelowna, British Columbia, Canada ("Club Penguin")."), if one
overlooks the section title, "Introduction." See Disney. Inc.. Club Penguin Terms of Use.
http://www.clubpenguin.com/terms.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2009).
16 544 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Va. 2008). aff'd on other grounds, rev'd on other grounds sub
nom; A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms. 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009). For an in-depth discus-
sion of this case see infra notes 135 155 and accompanying text.
17 iParadigms. 544 F.Supp.2d at 478. At the time the complaint was filed, Plaintiffs attended
high school in Virginia, and in the context of their high school studies, they were required to sub-
mit their papers to the Turnitin.com site or receive a zero for the assignment. Id.
[Vol. 112
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rights are born with the child's work and mature as quickly as rights for a work
authored by an adult.
II. RIGHTS FOR, AND RESTRAINTS ON, CHILD AUTHORS
Unsurprisingly, laws do apply to children. Children benefit from laws
as much as the children's adult counterparts, receiving constitutional protections
from birth (and in some instances, from before birth).'8 Additionally, equal
protection of the laws has been held to be as applicable to children as it is to
adults.1 9 A child's status as a child does not negate these protections, even
though arguably the child does nothing to earn them. A child pays little to no
taxes and does not vote. In fact, as a general rule, American society and its laws
protect the child more because of the child's status as a child. Laws provide
children with public education, provide police protections and heightened crim-
inal offenses for child victims, and design numerous civil protections and fur-
ther opportunities for children. As a class, compared with other demographic
classes in the United States, children are overprotected, a phenomenon neither
unusual nor unexpected.
This overprotection extends even further when the child is considered to
be an individual actor in a legal context. When the law appears to involve the
inability of the minor to appreciate fully an action that he has taken, laws either
prohibit the child from acting or excuse or rescue the child from acting badly or
irrationally. The above-mentioned legal prohibition of a child to vote until he
has reached the age of eighteen protects society from a vote ostensibly not cast
18 For purposes of this Article, because children lack the access to tangible mediums of ex-
pression on which to fix an original work until they are in fact separated from their mothers at
birth, I am assuming that children may begin to realize the potential of copyright at childbirth.
This Article makes no representation about when rights not related to intellectual property might
attach to a child, though it recognizes the possibility that an ultrasound of an unconsenting naked
fetus may in fact be interpreted to violate privacy rights. See Carey v. Population Services. Int'l,
431 U.S. 678, 693 (1977) (holding that the right to privacy in connection with decisions affecting
procreation extends to minors as well as adults); Aid for Women v. Foulston, 441 F.3d 1101,
1116-17 (10th Cir. 2006) (concluding the right of informational privacy extends to minors);
Planned Parenthood of S. Ariz. v. Lawall, 307 F.3d 783, 789 (9th Cir. 2002) (recognizing "a
young woman's privacy interest in avoiding disclosure of sensitive personal information."); Doe
v. Irwin, 615 F.2d 1162, 1166 (6th Cir. 1980) ("Though the state has somewhat broader authority
to regulate the conduct of children than that of adults, minors do possess a constitutionally pro-
tected right of privacy."); Wynn v. Carey. 582 F.2d 1375, 1384 (7th Cir.1978) (quoting Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("[A] minor possesses the right of privacy, defined as 'the
right of the individual ... to be free of unwarranted governmental intrusion into ... the decision
whether to bear or beget a child,' [but] that right is not unqualified.")). The author declines to
enter into that discussion for purposes of this Article but encourages the dialogue to continue.
19 Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (holding that minors, as
well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights).
20 See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI ("The right of citizens of the United States, who are eigh-
teen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any
State on account of age.").
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with full understanding of the issues at hand.2 1 Additionally, it protects the
child from outside influence and pressure to vote in a way that the child would
not otherwise believe if the child possessed the maturity to form a fully-
informed opinion.2 The capacity of the child's mind is taken into account when
considering a variety of potential offenses and behaviors. Bad actions may be
excused when a child lacks the mental capacity to form sufficient intent to
commit an intentional crime, such as murder or battery.23 Laws can also rescue
a child's bad or irrational decisions - for example, in the infancy doctrine for
contracting, which allows a child to avoid certain contracts made before the
child attained the age of majority.24
In cases involving child authorship, two categories of laws must be con-
sidered. The first legal consideration involves which rights the child author
receives as a benefit for creating a copyrighted work. The second involves the
child's ability to contract concerning that work and the ability to invalidate such
a contract under the infancy doctrine.25
21 For example, the argument against incorporating the eighteen-year-old voting age in the
Twenty-sixth Amendment to the Constitution included rationales that "young people between the
ages of 18 and 21 lack the maturity and experience that the exercise of the right to vote demands
in a free society." "[p]hysical maturity is quite different from social and political maturity," and
"[t]he right to vote should be restricted to those who are mature enough to assume the full respon-
sibilities of citizenship." Thomas H. Neale, The Eighteen- Year- Old Vote: The Twenty-Sixth
Amendment and Subsequent Voting Rates of Newly Enfranchised Age Groups, Congressional
Research Service Report No. 83-103 GOV (May 20, 1983) (citing Doris W. Jones, Lowering the
Voting Age to 18 Years: Pro and Con Arguments, U.S. Library of Congress Legislative Reference
Service (1959)).
22 For example, several U.S. schools decided not to air the speech of President Barack Obama
to U.S. schoolchildren in an attempt to protect them from perceived political influence. See, e.g.,
Obama Urges Students to Work Hard, Stay in School, CNN, available at
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/09/08/obama.school.speech/index.htmliref=newssearch
(last visited Sept. 11. 2009).
23 See, e.g., State v. Pittman, 647 S.E.2d 144, 153-54 (S.C. 2007) ("Where a person is between
seven and fourteen years of age, he is presumed not to have the mental capacity of committing a
crime, but that is a rebuttable presumption."); People v. Stowe, 790 N.Y.S.2d 521, 522 (N.Y.A.D.
2 Dept. 2005) ("As a juvenile offender [under the age of 16]. the defendant cannot be held crimi-
nally responsible for felony murder where the underlying felony, attempted robbery, is a crime for
which he cannot be held criminally responsible."); Bragan ex. rel. Bragan v. Symanzik. 687
N.W.2d 881, 888 (Mich. App. 2004) ("Children under the age of seven are presumptively incapa-
ble of committing negligent or criminal acts or intentional torts.").
24 See See LORD, supra note 11, at § 9:5, p. 35 ("an infant's contract or transfer is voida-
ble..."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 14.
25 Admittedly, a third legal category should be considered in order to examine all rights and
liabilities concerning childhood authorship. Infringement of copyright is a tort which requires no
specific intent on the part of the infringer. See Zurich Ins. Co. (U.S. Branch) v. Killer Music, 998
F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding copyright infringement can be innocent or intentional). But it
could require an examination of intent when examining a defense of fair use. See Int'l Stamp Art
v. U.S. Postal Serv., 456 F.3d 1270 (11 th Cir. 2006) (finding a likelihood of confusion standard,
including questions of intent, may be appropriate to analyze fair use). A child author could in-
fringe an existing work by creating an unlicensed derivative work of the existing work. This is an
[Vol. 112
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A. Rights for Child Authors: Copyright
Most intellectual property rights that would benefit children due to the
child's creation of that intellectual property would be protected under copy-
right.' 6 In the United States, copyright is the mechanism that protects most au-
thors and works of authorship. It has its roots in the U.S. Constitution, which
extends to Congress the ability to protect authors and their writings.2  Con-
gress's current iteration of this directive is the Copyright Act of 1976, which
protects original works of authorship fixed in tangible mediums of expression. 28
Provided the work is one that can be protected,29 the author receives the rights
afforded to authors in the Copyright Act, dependent upon the type of work. The
six rights enumerated in § 106 of the Copyright Act are rights of reproduction,
creation of derivative works, distribution, performance, display, and digital per-
formance. 30  Depending on the type of work, additional rights and protections
may be available. 3' These protections are not contingent upon registration of
the copyrighted work32 and can be transferred or licensed in whole or in part.33
Section 201 of the Copyright Act governs ownership, declaring that
"[c]opyright in a work.., vests initially in the author or authors of the work. 34
The Copyright Act is silent regarding the definition of the term "author." Sec-
interesting topic which merits a longer discussion. Other cases not involving initial child author-
ship have considered child infringers and as a rule have held them liable.
26 This is not to say that children cannot create other forms of intellectual property. The Patent
and Trademark Depository Library Association has posted a list of child inventors, including the
inventors of items of everything from toy trucks and chalk storage to luminescent writing and a
mop head cover. See Patent Search Presentation to Young Inventors,
http://www.ptdla.org/journal/2001giles (last visited Feb. 26, 2009). Young entrepreneurs also
may secure a trademark in their companies; for example, Adam Hildreth founded the British tech-
nology venture Crisp Thinking when he was age thirteen. See Crisp.
http://www.crispthinking.com/about.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2009).
27 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
28 1976 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006). Unless otherwise expressly specified, all
references to the "Copyright Act" herein refer to the 1976 Copyright Act.
29 Works that cannot be protected include works that lack originality, such as those listed
under 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
30 17 U.S.C. § 106. Not all rights are available to all works; for example, the right to digital
performance is limited to sound recordings.
31 For example, for works of visual art, the author may claim rights of attribution and integrity.
Id. § 106A.
32 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 1 (rev. July 2008) [hereinafter U.S. COPYRIGHT
OFFICE, CIRCULAR 1], at 3 ("No publication or registration or other action in the Copyright Office
is required to secure copyright."). However, registration confers certain benefits upon the copy-
right owner, including the ability to file an action for copyright infringement. Id. at 7.
3 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1) (2006) ("The ownership of a copyright may be transferred in whole
or in part by any means of conveyance or by operation of law .....
3 Id. § 20 1(a). In addition to the types of ownership addressed supra, § 201 addresses joint
authorship. works made for hire, and collective works.
2010]
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ondary sources define it as "one who produces, by his own intellectual labor
applied to the materials of his composition, an arrangement or compilation new
in itself;" 35 or, "a person who makes or originates something; creator; origina-
tor."36 From the Copyright Office's perspective, "the individual who actually
created the work is the author except in the case of a 'work made for hire.'37
For authors who are not working anonymously or for hire, the duration
of the rights afforded by a copyright is contingent upon age. 38 Section 302 of
the Copyright Act provides that "Copyright in a work created on or after Janu-
ary 1, 1978, subsists from its creation and, except as provided by the following
subsections, endures for a term consisting of the life of the author and 70 years
after the author's death., 39 The very minimum, then, that a copyright may last
is seventy years (assuming death immediately upon the work's creation). For
authors of joint works, a copyright may last even longer than seventy years
beyond an author's life; if an author is survived by a joint author, a deceased
joint author's heirs will enjoy a copyright for seventy years from the surviving
joint author's death, even if that event occurs long after the first author's
death.4"
With the exception of the predeceasing joint author, copyright lasts
longest for those who write when they are young and live long lives. The Copy-
right Act contains no age limit for the author who applies for a copyright. In
fact, the sole guidance for an author's age comes not from the statute, but from
the Copyright Office in its Circular 1: "Minors may claim copyright, but state
laws may regulate the business dealings of copyrights owned by minors.' In a
3 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 151 52 (9th ed. 2009) [hereinafter BLACK'S].
36 WEBSTER'SNEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 92 (3d ed. 1997) (1988).
3 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, APPLICATION FOR COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION. FORM CO
INSTRUCTIONS 2 (2009), available at http://www.copyright.gov/forms/formco2d-ins.pdf: 17
U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
A "work made for hire" is (1) a work prepared by an employee within the
scope of his or her employment: or (2) a work specially ordered or commis-
sioned for use as a contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion pic-
ture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a
compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or
as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by
them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire.
Id.
38 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (2006) ("In the case of an anonymous work, a pseudonymous work, or a
work made for hire, the copyright endures for a term of 95 years from the year of its first publica-
tion, or a term of 120 years from the year of its creation, whichever expires first.").
I ld. § 302(a).
40 Id. § 302(b).
41 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 1 at 2.
[Vol. 112
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rare deference to state laws with respect to copyright, the Copyright Office ac-
knowledges that when children are concerned, the state laws control.42
B. Additional Rights for, but Also Restraints on, Child Authors: Contract
Implicit in the recognition of state laws when concerning copyrights
owned by minors is the suggestion that the ownership of copyright may be tem-
pered by areas of law other than copyright. The consideration of business deal-
ings concerning copyright necessitates consultation and interpretation of con-
tract law. Like other legal areas, courts view contracts with minors as instru-
ments to be handled with great care. Accordingly, it has long been a legal tradi-
tion for the courts to offer increased protections to minors when they are parties
to contracts. For generations, this has been accomplished through the contrac-
tual doctrine of infancy. The doctrine of infancy, which allows a minor to avoid
or disaffirm contracts, was recognized at common law as early as 1292. 43 The
principle that contracts were voidable at the election of the infant, regardless of
the fairness of the contract,4 4 was well settled by the fifteenth century.45
Like many legal concepts rooted in English law, including copyright,
46
the doctrine of infancy migrated to the United States. Common-law rules re-
garding an infant's lack of contractual capacity have "endured in the United
States . ..with considerable vitality. 47  Traditionally, the common law has
viewed minors as naYve and unsophisticated, especially in the marketplace.
48
Because of this marketplace vulnerability, the law assumes minors may have
been induced into contracts and therefore need additional protections. It follows
that courts have held that "[iun all suits or legal proceedings of whatever nature,
in which the personal or property rights of a minor are involved, the protective
powers of a court... may be invoked whenever it becomes necessary to fully
42 Because the ability to protect authors was afforded to Congress in the Constitution, the
Copyright Act provides that it preempts state laws with respect to copyrights. See 17 U.S.C. §
301 (a)(1). For further discussion see infra notes 119-120 and accompanying text.
43 Creech v. Melnick, 556 S.E.2d 587, 590 (N.C.App. 2001) (citing Robert E. Richards, Child-
ren and the Recorded Message Industry: The Need for a New Doctrine, 72 VA. L. REv. 1325,
1332-33 (1986)). See also LORD, supra note 11, at § 9.2, p. 5 (citing [1292] YB 20 and 21 Edw 1,
p. 318).
44 FARNSWORTH, supra note 12, at 443.
45 Creech, 556 S.E.2d at 590 (citing Gastonia Personnel Corp. v. Rogers, 172 S.E.2d 19, 20
(1970) (quoting 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 223 (3d ed. 1959))). However, the infant was held
liable for contracts for necessaries food, clothing, shelter.
46 One of the earliest copyright laws was the Statute of Anne.
47 Creech, 556 S.E.2d at 591 (quoting JOHN N. HUTSON, JR. & SCOTT A. MISKIMON, NORTH
CAROLINA CONTRACT LAW § 1-26, 30 (2001)).
48 Creech, 556 S.E.2d at 590 (quoting Robert E. Richards, Children and the Recorded-
Message Industry: The Need for a New Doctrine. 72 VA. L. REv. 1325. 1332 33 (1986)).
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protect such rights. 49 Under the doctrine of infancy, contracts with minors are
voidable at the minor's election, regardless of the minor's apparent age or ma-
turity or of the other party's knowledge of the minor's actual age.50
In the absence of a specific statute, contracts by minors are not invalid,
but voidable by the infant, 51 but the infant must disaffirm the contractual obliga-
tions within a reasonable time of attaining the age of majority in order to invali-
date the contract.52 While at common law the standard age of majority was
twenty-one, 53 in most states presently a person is a minor until the age of eigh-
teen. 54 When the infant's age is used as a shield rather than a sword - that is,
when the underage status is used to rebuff an attempt to enforce a contract - it
will be construed as favorably as possible to the infant without regard to the
unfairness to the adult. 55 In addition, courts have a general tendency to find in
favor of the infant and prevent the child from being taken advantage of by those
without a disability (adults).56
The doctrine of infancy has always had its share of legal critics. Henry
A. L. Hall decried "a blind and servile adherence to rules laid down by the
judges in England, two or three hundred years ago."5  Professor Larry DiMat-
teo noted that criticisms of and restrictions on the infancy doctrine dated to
1794, resulting in limitations on the ability to disaffirm contracts for "necessa-
ries" and time limits on when a minor can disaffirm.58 Professor DiMatteo calls
for the abolition of the infancy doctrine and replacing it with a "factors" test to
49 Creech v. Melnick, 556 S.E.2d 587. 590 (N.C.App. 2001) (quoting Latta v. Trustees of Gen.
Assembly of Presbyterian Church in U.S.. 196 S.E. 862, 866 (N.C. 1938)). For a thorough treat-
ment of the current state of the infancy doctrine and its application, see Juanda Lowder Daniel,
Virtually Mature: Examining the Policy of Minors' Incapacity to Contract through the Cybers-
cope, 43 GONZ. L. REV. 239, 244 (2008).
50 FARNSWORTH, supra note 12, at 443.
51 A notable exception is a contract for necesssaries, which is deemed valid. See note 47.
52 FARNSWORTH, supra note 12.
53 Id. at 443-44.
54 The age of majority is eighteen in all the states except for Alabama (nineteen), ALA. CODE §
26-1-1; Nebraska (nineteen), NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-2101; Wyoming (nineteen), WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 14-1-101; and Mississippi (twenty-one), Miss. CODE ANN. § 1-3-27. However, in the Mississip-
pi case Garrett v. Gay, 394 So.2d 321 (Miss. 1981), the age of majority is lowered to eighteen for
the purpose of entering into contractual relationships for personal property. In addition, certain
statutes addressing the age of majority allow for another statute to take precedence over the gener-
al majority age. (Alaska, Connecticut, Florida, Minnesota, Oklahoma. and Virginia).
55 FARNSWORTH, supra note 12, at 449.
56 Id. at 454.
57 Henry A. L. Hall, The Liability of an Infant Who Represents Himself ofAge, 8 YALE L.J. 235
(Feb. 1899) (criticizing the ability of infants to disaffirm contracts under common law when they
misrepresented their age to the adult contracting party).
58 Larry A. DiMatteo, Deconstructing the Myth of the Infancy Law Doctrine: From Incapacity
to Accountability. 21 OHIO N. U. L. REV. 481,488 (1994).
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determine the capacity of the minor to contract.59 In recent years, the perceived
increased sophistication of underage consumers online has increased the criti-
cism. Professor Larry Cunningham, noting the failure of most states to keep up-
to-date with studies on child psychology and adolescence, advocates the imple-
mentation of a Model Children's Code for revisions extending not only to con-
60tracts but also to all areas involving the legal status of children.
The doctrine of infancy has not been abolished, but years of implemen-
tation have restricted the instances in which it applies. For example, as noted
above, a minor cannot disaffirm contracts for "necessaries," those goods and
services "necessary for health and sustenance.' Necessaries include food,
medicine, clothes, shelter, or "personal services usually considered reasonably
essential for preservation and enjoyment of life. 62 Moreover, some obligations,
"because of public policy, statute, or implications drawn from statute, are bind-
ing on infants and cannot be disaffirmed. '63 However, even given these limita-
tions, it remains "a well-established general rule at common-law that a minor is
not liable on any contract he makes and that he may disaffirm the same. '64
III. YOUNG AUTHORS AND THE CONTRACTS THEY ENTER
As noted above, child authors enjoy the same ability to own a copyright
for their works as their adult counterparts. However, this ability is curbed by
the authors' youth. In the infancy doctrine, the very thing that is designed to
help young authors may in fact hinder their ability to enter into contracts at all.
Contracting parties often have special contingencies if the other contracting
party is a minor. For example, when actor Heath Ledger won an Academy
Award posthumously in February 2009, there was little question that the Oscar
statuette would go to his daughter and sole surviving heir, Matilda. 65 However,
the Academy concluded that she was "legally unable to sign the winner's
agreement - a contract required of all nominees that says the recipient will not
59 Id. at 524.
60 Larry Cunningham, A Question of Capacity: Towards a Comprehensive and Consistent
Vision of Children and Their Status Under Law, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. Juv. L. & POL'Y 275, 365
(Summer 2006). In areas of juvenile criminal law. however, proponents of the infancy doctrine
remain vocal. See, e.g., Andrew M. Carter, Age Matters: The Case for a Constitutionalized infan-
cy Defense, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 687 (April 2006); Barbara Kaban & James Orlando, Revitalizing
the Infancy Defense in the Contemporary Juvenile Court, in Symposium 2007, The Promise of in
re Gault: Promoting and Protecting the Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court, 60 RUTGERS L. REV.
33 (Fall 2007).
61 Douglass v. Pflueger Hawaii, Inc., 110 Haw. 520 (Haw. 2006).
62 Muller v. CES Credit Union, 832 N.E.2d 80 (Ohio App. 2005).
63 LORD, supra note 11, at § 9:6, p. 47.
64 Williams v. Baptist Health Systems, Inc., 2003 WL 1120186 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003).
65 Associated Press, And the Oscar Goes to Matilda if Ledger Wins (February 18, 2009),
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resell his or her Oscar without first offering it back to the academy for $1.,66
Under California Family Code § 6701, a minor may not make a contract relating
to any personal property not in the immediate possession or control of the mi-67
nor; therefore, while Matilda Ledger is legally entitled to the Oscar, her moth-
er signed the winner's agreement and retained control of the statuette until Ma-
tilda reaches the age of eighteen, when she can legally sign the agreement under
California law.68
While examples of reservations are evident, these reservations have not
prevented minors and minor authors from entering into agreements regarding
their copyrights. And, it logically follows that it has not prevented the courts
from becoming involved in those agreements.
A. Offline Copyright Contracts
Several states anticipate contracts with minors, albeit not in the context
of the minor's creation of a copyrighted work. Few cases have in fact dealt with
instances where an infant has created a work subject to copyright, but evidence
of young authors is abundant. For example, composer Wolfgang Amadeus Mo-
zart was writing musical works by the age of five 6 9 and, by the age of eighteen,
had written three operas. 70 Diarist Anne Frank was only thirteen when she be-
gan to write her diary, although she likely did not think that it would become a
commercial success at the time she wrote it.
71
In Valjo Music Publishing Corporation v. Elvis Presley Music, although
the Southern District of New York did not expressly deal with a contract that
was entered into by infants, it accepted that minors could be the authors of mus-
ical works. 2 At issue was a dispute over the authorship of the song "Hound
Dog," made popular by vocal artist Elvis Presley.73 In Valo, plaintiff Johnny
Otis alleged that he was the co-author of the song along with two defendants,
Jerry Leiber and Mike Stoller, who were minors at the time "Hound Dog" was
written.7 4 Otis rationalized a prior settlement agreement with the two by saying
66 Id.
67 CAL. FAm. CODE § 6701(3) (West 1994). A minor is also prohibited from giving a delega-
tion of power or from making a contract with respect to real property.
68 Associated Press. supra note 65.
69 OTTO ERICH DEUTSCH, MOZART: A DOCUMENTARY BIOGRAPHY 455 (Stanford University
Press 1966).
70 RUTH HALLIWELL, THE MOZART FAMILY: FOUR LIVES IN A SOCIAL CONTEXT 172, 183 85
(Oxford: Oxford University Press 1998).
71 ANNE FRANK, DIARY OF A YOUNG GIRL 2 4 (B.M. Mooyaart-Doubleday trans.. Bantam
Books 1993) (1967) ("[i]t seems to me that neither I nor anyone else for that matter will be
interested in the musings of a thirteen-year-old schoolgirl.").
72 156 F. Supp. 568 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
73 Id. at 569.
74 Id. at 568, 570.
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that he learned that the defendants were infants and would, therefore, disaffirm
any contract that they had with him.75 The court noted that this made no sense
and alluded to the fact that minors could author works of music: "Otis was a
man who had many years experience in the music business. He must have rea-
lized that even though Leiber and Stoller were infants they could not disaffirm
his co-authorship of a song, if in fact he had been a co-author. 76 In saying this,
the court appeared to accept as a matter of course that in entertainment, minors
author music and enter into contracts regarding that music as part of the busi-
ness culture.
B. Online Copyright Contracts
When considering the ability of minors to contract online, often scholars
pay heed to those contracts which benefit the young contractors to certain de-
triment of the adult contracting party. For example, Professor Juanna Lowder
Daniel focuses on the purchasing power of minors through electronic com-
merce, noting that "merchants are ... forced to reckon with the minority inca-
pacity doctrine, despite the level of sophistication demonstrated by minors in
their interactions with cyberspace."7  She also identifies "sophisticated unto-
ward behavior," "online criminal activity," and "electronic misdeeds," all of
which question continued protection of minors for online transactions. 78
Professor Daniel is entirely justified in identifying the bad-actor child-
ren as a lens through which to view and critique the infancy doctrine. On the
other hand, however, child authors such as Akiane Kramarik are not necessarily
acting with a level of malice that Professor Daniel and others anticipate. The
opportunities for minors to engage in authorship and publicize young creative
writing have multiplied with the expansion of the Internet and social networking
sites, even those directed at children under the age of ten. As demonstrated
above, when any of these young authors create their works, they are automati-
cally covered by copyright and given the rights to reproduce, create derivative
works, distribute, perform, and display as befits the particular situation.79 In the
case of young authors, however, these rights are almost immediately compro-
mised because the electronic media where most young authors post their works
automatically limit their rights through the terms and conditions of their sites.
Some sites actually first encourage authorship and posting, then proceed
to limit the rights the author would otherwise enjoy had she written it with pen
75 Id. at 570.
76 Id.
77 Daniel, supra note 49. at 255.
78 Id.
79 17 U.S.C. § 106.
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and paper instead of posting it online. For example, the Contra Costa Times, 80
serving Contra Costa County, California, has for years incorporated a Teen
Board. 8' Recently, the Board "went digital," inspiring the LIP Teen Blog "I
Should Be Doing My Homework."8 2 The blog allows teens to write about a
variety of topics, from school politics to summer jobs, from social activism on-
line to dismay over the delay of the next Harry Potter movie installment.8 3 The
members of the Teen Board post often and in detail.
By posting on the blog, authors agree to grant:
a perpetual, irrevocable, royalty-free, non-exclusive,
worldwide license, with the right to use, copy, sublicense, mod-
ify, adapt, transmit, distribute, publicly perform or display such
material. The foregoing grants shall include the right to exploit
any proprietary rights in such material, including but not limited
to rights under copyright, trademark, service mark or patent
laws in any jurisdiction. All rights in this paragraph are granted
84
without compensation of any sort to you.
In another example, Facebook is a "social utility" that "facilitate[s] the
sharing of information through the social graph, the digital mapping of people's
real-world social connections., 8 5 J.C. 86 posts regularly on facebook.com, invit-
ing status updates from his friends and posting his own. While not authorship to
the artistic or creative level of Akiane, his writings are in fact protected by copy-
right, which merely requires originality and fixation in a tangible medium of
expression. 8' Yet postings on facebook.com are subject to the following li-
cense:
you automatically grant, ... to the Company an irrevocable,
perpetual, non-exclusive, transferable, fully paid, worldwide li-
cense (with the right to sublicense) to use, copy, publicly per-
80 The Contra Costa Times, located online at www.contracostatimes.com, is part of the Bay
Area News Group, which serves the San Francisco Bay area. See Bay Area News Group.
www.bayareanewsgroup.com (last visited Nov. 1. 2009).
81 The Life in Perspective Teen Board is made up of teens who write feature stories and col-
uns for the Contra Costa Times. See Life in Perspective Teen Board,
http://www.contracostatimes.com/teens (last visited Dec. 12, 2009).
82 LIP stands for "Life in Perspective." See LIP Teen Blog, http://www.ibabuzz.com/lip/ (last
visited Sept. 22. 2008).
83 See id.
84 Id.
85 Facebook, Facebook Factsheet, http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?factsheet (last
visited Feb. 28. 2009).
86 My cousin, who like many teens would be mortified if I actually identified him by name.
87 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
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form, publicly display, reformat, translate, excerpt (in whole or
in part) and distribute such User Content for any purpose,
commercial, advertising, or otherwise, on or in connection with
the Site or the promotion thereof, to prepare derivative works
of, or incorporate into other works, such User Content, and to
grant and authorize sublicenses of the foregoing. . . . If you
choose to remove your User Content, the license granted above
will automatically expire, however you acknowledge that the
Company may retain archived copies of your User Content. 88
More accurately, that was the license at the time of his posting. On
February 4, 2009, Facebook posted a new license that removed the last language
of that license, removing the expiration of the license and including a provision
that the license paragraph survived any termination of the license by the own-
er.8 9 After complaints from tens of thousands of users and a threatened Federal
Trade Commission complaint by consumer watchdog Electronic Privacy Infor-
mation Center, Facebook reversed its policy, returning to its previous Terms of
Use just two weeks after changing them. 90
Another popular social networking site is Club Penguin, created by Dis-
ney and popular with pre-teens. 91 According to the Club Penguin parents' page:
Players create a penguin and explore the snow-covered island of
Club Penguin, engaging in a variety of fun and imaginative ac-
tivities. Players can chat, send greeting cards, use emotes (emo-
tion icons), or choose from a set of pre-defined actions such as
waving or dancing. Users can also attend parties and special
events, take on a role in the latest stage play, adopt and care for
88 Facebook Terms & Conditions, http://www.facebook.com/terms.php?ref-pf (last visited
Feb. 28, 2009).
89 See, e.g., Chris Walters, Facebook's New Terms of Service: "We Can Do Anything We
Want With Your Content. Forever." THE CONSUMERIST (Feb. 15. 2009).
http://consumerist.com/2009/02/facebooks-new-terms-of-service-we-can-do-anything-we-want-
with-your-content-forever.html#comments-content (last visited Dec. 12, 2009).
90 See Douglas MacMillan, The Complaint Almost Filed Against Facebook, The Tech Beat,
Bus. WK. (Feb. 18, 2009). available at http://www.businessweek.com/the-thread/techbeat/
archives/2009/02/the complaint a.html. The author recognizes that Facebook may not be the
most popular mode of online social networking at this time. That honor may have passed to twit-
ter.com, "a service for friends, family, and co-workers to communicate and stay connected
through the exchange of quick, frequent answers to one simple question: What are you doing?'
Twitter, http://twitter.com (last visited April 4. 2009). The Twitter terms of service actively pro-
hibits users under the age of 13. Twitter, Previous Terms of Service.
http://twitter.com/tos archive/version 1 (last visited Nov. 9, 2009). So for the most part. it falls
outside the scope of this Article. However, it is interesting to note that although it prohibits the
use of the service by most underage posters, it also has the most liberal copyright ownership pro-
visions, even terming the entire "Copyright" section, "(What's Yours is Yours)." Id.
9' Club Penguin lists the target age as 6 14, but notes that it is open to all ages.
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a cute and cuddly puffle pet, and play games to earn virtual
coins which can be used to design the perfect igloo and create
hundreds of outfits for their penguin. New content is added
every week. 92
Club Penguin acts much like an adult gaming counterpart, Second
Life, 93 in that it is a virtual world where penguins can waddle around and meet
one another. In addition, members can write for the Club Penguin Times, the
free Club Penguin newspaper delivered every Thursday. 94 Members are encour-
aged to author articles,95 jokes,96 poems,97 and other works that are copyrighta-
ble.
Disney's license to use the content, ostensibly aimed at a very young
age group, is most comprehensive and includes concessions the others do not.
Not only does the license include:
a perpetual, non-exclusive, irrevocable, fully-paid, royalty-free,
sub-licensable and transferable (in whole or part) worldwide li-
cense under all copyrights, trademarks, patents, trade secrets,
privacy and publicity rights and other intellectual property
rights you own or control to use, reproduce, transmit, display,
exhibit, distribute, index, comment on, modify (including re-
moving lyrics and music from any Submission or substituting
the lyrics and music in any Submission with music and lyrics
selected by us), create derivative works based upon, perform
and otherwise exploit such Submissions, in whole or in part, in
92 Club Penguin Parents' Guide, http://www.clubpenguin.com/parents/clubpenguin
guide.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2009) [hereinafter "Penguin"].
93 Second Life is an online three-dimensional virtual world maintained by Linden Lab of San
Francisco, California. Users create their own personas in the form of avatars. and explore worlds
that are created by users to provide a virtual space to interact with other peoples' avatars. See
Second Life, http://secondlife.com/whatis/?lang en-US#Welcome (last visited Nov. 1. 2009); see
also Press Release, Linden Lab Announces Name of New Onlien World 'Second Life TM' And
Availability of Beta Program (Oct. 30, 2002), available at
http://lindenlab.com/pressroom/releases/02 10 30.
94 See, e.g.. Club Penguin Times (Nov. 26. 2009),
http://medial.clubpenguin.com/play/v2/content/local/en/news/20091126.swf.
95 Club Disney also encourages the participation. displaying in capital letters "WE NEED
YOU!" next to the title of the newspaper. See id.. page D, labeled "SUBMIT YOUR
CONTENT."
96 Contributed by 01chance: "There was a polar bear that went to a candy store and said, '1
would like some lemon heads, candy canes, and ... Umm ... Ahh ... Umm ... Ahh ... Oh
yeah! Jelly Beans!' The shopowner asked. 'Why the large pause?' The polar bear answered, 'I
don't know, I've had them my whole life."'
97 Contributed by Rooney 348: "By day. shut in his workshop./Joe Bright cuts bits oftin,/And
smoothes them out and flattens them./Until they're paper thin./At dusk Joe Bright flies sky-
wards,/With boxes, bags. and jars,/And on the branches of the dark,/He hangs a million stars."
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all media formats and channels now known or hereafter devised
(including on WDIG Sites, on third party web sites, on our
broadcast and cable networks and stations, on our broadband
and wireless platforms, products and services, on physical me-
dia, and in theatrical release) for any and all purposes including
entertainment, news, advertising, promotional, marketing, pub-
licity, trade or commercial purposes, all without further notice
to you, with or without attribution, and without the requirement
of any permission from or payment to you or to any other per-
son or entity[;] 98
it also appoints Disney representatives to be agents to execute contracts on be-
half of the authors (presumably all children), and it includes a waiver of en-
forcement of moral rights. 99 Again, as soon as the creative content is submitted
to the site, the rights are curtailed, and rights that may not even exist in the
United States are stripped from the users.
The Creative Commons license is another way in which minor authors
may subsequently realize what that "legal jargon" was about, well after the
piece that they had written had been published and even further after the minor
had reached the age of majority. Creative Commons licenses "attach to the
work and authorize everyone who comes in contact with the work to use it con-
sistent with the license."100 It is foreseeable that, for example, a student who
uses information published in the Creative Commons in order to finish his or her
work may wish to disavow this license restriction once she is of the age of ma-
jority, realizing that her work is copyrighted and may have value outside the
Creative Commons. The student may have had full notice of the restrictions
before contracting, but not the capability of understanding what accepting those
restrictions would mean for her work.
IV. COPYRIGHT AND CONTRACT: THE DILEMMA
It is possible that the contracting infant doctrine could save minors from
having portions of their copyrights so rudely snatched away by those sites that
would encourage the creation of content. However, proposals that have ques-
tioned the viability of the contracting infant doctrine have existed for decades.
As early as the nineteenth century, a New York court noted:
[A] protracted struggle has been maintained in the courts, on the
one hand to protect infants or minors from their own improvi-
dence and folly, and to save them from the depredations and
98 Penguin, supra note 92.
99 Id.
I00 Creative Commons Frequently Asked Questions. http://wiki.creativecommons.org/FAQ
(last visited Nov. 9, 2009).
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frauds practiced upon them by the designing and the unprin-
cipled, and on the other to protect the rights of those dealing
with them in good faith and on the assumption that they could
lawfully make contracts. 101
More recent scholarship has also questioned the viability of the infancy
doctrine than has defended it. In addition to the criticisms noted by Professors
DiMatteo and Cunningham above, Professor Daniel noted that other areas of the
law (torts, crimes, and medical treatment) "operate under rebuttable presump-
tions of capacity... allowing inquiry into whether the minor truly understood
the nature and consequences of his actions."'10 2 Professor Daniel suggests that
the burden of establishing contractual incapacity rests on the minor adolescent,
establishing a sense of responsibility for that contracting person. 103 She notes
that traditional contractual avoidances would remove the need for the contract-
ing infant doctrine; if the law were to treat the infants as adults, then those same
defenses would be available to them. 104 Specifically, she discusses misrepresen-
tation, undue influence, duress, and unconscionability. o'
Regardless of the type of contract to which these defenses refer, for
three out of four, the situations to which they would pertain appear to be limited
at best. It is possible that a misrepresentation, an intentional false statement
respecting a matter of fact relevant to a contract, °6 may induce a minor to enter
into a contract for goods and be misled as to the type or quality of goods he is
contracting to procure. The defenses of undue influence and duress, 10 7 however,
seem to have little if any sway for contracts where the minor and the seller have
little if any contact. In addition, Professor Daniel's focus appears to be the con-
tracting by minors for goods that can be purchased and sold online. Additional
sites, however, might in fact be detrimental to the minor because the minor is
not availing himself of a good or making a purchase per se, but instead is mere-
ly agreeing to the terms of use to which the site mandates every person agree.
In those cases, it is difficult to see how misrepresentation, undue influence, or
duress would apply.
On the other hand, the defense of unconscionability may have more
teeth with the average click-wrap agreement. Professor Daniel notes that "the
widely-accepted definition of unconscionability has been stated as the 'absence
101 FARNSWORTH, supra note 12, at 444 (citing Henry v. Root. 33 N.Y. 526, 536 (1865)).
102 Daniel, supra note 49, at 268.
103 Id. Professor Daniel acknowledges that a presumption of incapacity for pre-adolescent mi-
nors is appropriate. Id.
104 See id. at 258.
105 See id. at 258-61.
106 See BLACK'S, supra note 35, at 1091.
107 "Undue influence," in contractual terms, suggests that the contract would not have been
entered into but for the "dominion and control" of another. Id. at 1666. "Duress" similarly in-
volves threats and the removal of a contracting party's free will. Id. at 578 79.
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of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract
terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party."' 108 She continues:
"a minor who finds himself in a one-sided contract procured through unfair bar-
gaining can avail himself of the opportunity to avoid the contract. Thus, this
modern doctrine seems to address the very concerns behind the ancient doctrine
of minority incapacity to contract." 109
Some would say that unconscionability should apply beyond the click-
wrap agreements. Professor Steven Hetcher has argued that the defense should
extend to typical terms and conditions as well, which must be affirmatively
sought out by the user in order to learn their content. Professor Hetcher ex-
amines the social networking site facebook.com in detail and notes that the
terms and conditions to which the user must agree are unfair, especially when
considering the interests of minors:
[M]inors, like other users who wish to remain on the site, click
a button to signify acceptance of the Terms of Use. Given the
nature of this procedure, the question naturally arises as to
whether the Terms of Service constitute a contract of adhesion,
and if so, an unconscionable one."0
Professor Hetcher's arguments run counter to those of Professor Daniel.
He explains that "while it may be a legal fiction to do so," because of the rela-
tive inexperience of minors, they cannot be held accountable for the terms and
conditions as adults - despite the fact that they took the affirmative step to
accept the terms by signifying their acceptance of them by checking a box be-
fore using the site. "'1
Professor Hetcher thereafter does not seek to eradicate the contracting
infant doctrine, but instead wants to fortify it by extending an implied license
with the guardians of the minors to use content posted on facebook.com. By
doing so, Professor Hetcher notes, "it would presumably disallow Facebook or
its successors in interest from claiming permanent [user-generated content] in-
terests at some later time, on the basis of capacious, largely incomprehensible
lawyerly jargon, located in a form contract the person clicked through years
earlier when a minor."'
1 2
108 Daniel, supra note 49. at 261 (quoting Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d
445. 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965)).
109 Id. (citing Walter D. Navin, Jr., The Contracts of Minors Viewed From the Perspective of
Fair Exchange. 50 N.C. L. REv. 517. 520 (1972)).
110 Steven Hetcher, User-Generated Content and the Future of Copyright: Part Two Agree-
ments Between Users and Mega-Sites, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 829, 858
(May 2008).
III Id. at 858-59.
112 Id. at 866.
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The difficulty that the creation of an implied license imposes on minors
is the implicit devaluation or joint authorship of the minors' copyrighted
works.1 3 As noted above, the Copyright Act places no age restriction on au-
thorship.11 4 At the same time, it reserves the particular economic rights that it
affords exclusively to the author of the work.1 5 Because it is silent as to a min-
imum age required when authoring a work, likewise it is silent as to parents'
ability to enjoy the benefits the Copyright Act might bestow upon infant authors
just by virtue of their parenthood. 11 6 While state laws have attempted to provide
some protection with respect to child actors,1 7 laws are silent with respect to
any additional child authorship rights. 18
Moreover, such an extension of a license to parents of minor authors
may be the type of law specifically preempted by the Copyright Act. Because
inherently contracts are governed by state laws, the law of implied contracts is
also governed by state laws. State laws that conflict with the Copyright Act
may in certain instances be preempted by the Copyright Act, to the extent that
those state statutes conflict. The Copyright Act provides for the statutory
preemption of state laws in those situations where two conditions are satisfied.
First, the legal or equitable right afforded by the state law must be equivalent to
any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by
§ 106.119 Second, the legal or equitable right applies to works of authorship that
are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within the subject matter
of copyright. 120
If an implied license is extended to the parents of minor authors, appli-
cation of the Copyright Act appears to preempt the state license. First, the legal
H, An additional theoretical difficulty may exist in that several minor authors may not want
their parents to know that which they have posted on Facebook. much less have the ability to
impliedly license it.
114 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
115 17 U.S.C. § 106. Those economic rights are the right to reproduce the copyrighted work, to
make derivative works from the work, to distribute the work, to perform the work, to display the
work, and to perform the work digitally. Id.
116 Unfortunately, it is not a foregone conclusion that parents have the best interest of their
children at heart. The foundation, A Minor Consideration, for example, exists to provide guidance
to young performers, noting that "Child Stars must pick their parents with care." A Minor Con-
sideration, http://www.minorcon.org/index.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2009).
117 "Coogan laws" are named after child actor Jackie Coogan, who lost all earnings to his un-
scrupulous parents. These laws exist in California (CAL. LAB. CODE § 1308.5, CAL. CODE REG.
11753), New York (N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-7-1), New Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN. §
34:2-21.57 et seq.), New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 11-1-4), and Louisiana (LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 23:15 1-234) and affirm that earnings of child actors belong to the actors themselves, not to their
parents.
118 For a complete list of state employment statutes with respect to child employment, see gen-
erally Screen Actors Guild, http://www.sag.org/content/state-statutes (last visited Sept. 7, 2009).
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or equitable right afforded by the license must be equivalent to any of the exclu-
sive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by § 106.121 The
implied license made available to parents via Facebook and other social net-
working sites appears to do just that: extend to parents the ability to consent to
reproduction, distribution, and display of the child's work. Second, the re-
quirement that the works of authorship are fixed in a tangible medium of ex-
pression and come within the subject matter of copyright would be met just by
virtue of their publication on Facebook, as long as the subject matter of such
works falls within what is legally acceptable. 
123
Furthermore, even if an implied license is not specifically preempted by
the Copyright Act, such an omission may be the type that falls under the general
preemptive power of the Constitution. This power is contained within the Su-
premacy Clause of the Constitution, which states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme Law of the land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. 
1 24
In other words, no law of any state may conflict with the Constitution or
the laws of the United States. Called conflict preemption, under the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution, states cannot enact laws that interfere with the pur-
poses of the federal copyright laws.
Copyright is one of those provinces given exclusively to Congress in the
Constitution. Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 states: "To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries. ,125 For a state
to interfere with the powers of copyright would be for that state to act in direct
conflict with the Constitution. Examples of such state laws that are preempted
121 See, e.g.. Wilchcombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc.. 555 F.3d 949. 956 (1lth Cir. 2009) (citing
Jacob Maxwell, Inc. v. Veeck. 110 F.3d 749, 753 (1 1th Cir. 1996) ("A copyright owner waives
his right to sue for copyright infringement while the nonexclusive license is in effect.")).
122 Perhaps the other rights are implicated as well; however, the rights most pertinent to Face-
book would be the aforementioned rights.
123 In order for a work to be copyrightable, the work must be fixed in "any tangible medium of
expression" and must be original. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). In order for a work to be original, it must
possess a minimum degree of creativity and a modicum of creativity. Feist Publ'n. Inc. v. Rural
Tel. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282. 1287 (1991).
124 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
125 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
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include state unfair competition laws prohibiting unauthorized copying of prod-
uct designs that are neither copyrighted nor patented. 
1 26
Not all state laws are preempted in this manner. For example, the state
regulation of trade secrets is not preempted. 127 Where there is a situation where
Congress has not established a policy with respect to a particular class of works,
states are free to act. 28 Similarly, contracts which create rights that are similar
to those discussed here are generally not held to be preempted by the Copyright
Act. ProCD v. Zeidenberg12 9 established that, because the rights created by
contract are created by individuals and not laws, they are not "equivalent to any
of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright," and therefore not
preempted by the Copyright Act.1 30 In ProCD, the Seventh Circuit found that a
shrinkwrap license for a software product bound the user to its terms, including
the prohibition from copying data from the software database. 131 As such, con-
tracts could protect the contents of a database, even if the Copyright Act specifi-
cally excluded those contents from copyright protection, and were not subject to
preemption. 132
In some instances, however, contracts have been found to be preempted.
For example, the Ninth Circuit, in Rano v. Sipa Press, Inc., held that "a state law
allowing contracts of unspecified duration to be terminated at will was
preempted by § 203 of the 1976 Act (which allows grantors to terminate copy-
right grants after 35 years, even if the grant specifies a longer term)."1 33 Other
circuits have squarely rejected Rano, finding no conflict preemption, because §
203 does not require copyright grants to last for a minimum 35-year term.
34
The purpose of § 203 is to protect authors from being locked into unfavorable
long-term contracts, and state law termination-at-will provisions support rather
than conflict with that goal. In contrast, a state law that prohibited early termi-
nations of copyright grants would be preempted by § 203 to the extent it pre-
126 See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 226-30 (1964); Compco Corp. v.
Day-Brite Lighting. Inc., 376 U.S. 234. 238 39 (1964).
127 See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.. 416 U.S. 470, 474 (1974). But see Bonito Boats, Inc.
v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141. 167 (1989) (holding a state law prohibiting a method
of copying preempted).
128 Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973) (finding unconstitutional a California criminal
law prohibiting the unauthorized copying of uncopyrighted musical recordings).
129 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
130 Id. at 1454.
131 Id. at 1455.
132 Of course, this premise invites debate. See, e.g., Kristen Osenga, Information May Want to
be Free, but Information Products Do Not: Protecting and Facilitating Transactions in Informa-
tion Products, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2099, 2116 (2009) (discussing the pros and cons of protecting
information with contract).
133 Rano v. Sipa Press, Inc., 987 F.2d 580, 585 (9th Cir. 1993).
134 See e.g..Walthal v. Rusk, 172 F.3d 481 (7th Cir. 1999): Korman v. HBC Florida. Inc., 182
F.3d 1291 (1 lth Cir. 1999).
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vented grantors from terminating their contracts at the end of 35 years. The
treatment of this decision signals the courts' overwhelming preference not to
preempt contract law with copyright.
V. RECENT DECISION: A. V . IPARADIGMS
The problem of online infant contracting has not gone unnoticed by the
courts, but it has not necessarily been taken seriously, either. In March 2008, in
A. V v. iParadigms, the Eastern District of Virginia almost summarily dismissed
the invocation of the infancy defense.1 35 The facts may have warranted that the
young plaintiff authors should lose the case, but the court's opinion, in avoiding
established legal doctrines, raises new questions that might have broader impli-
cations for online licensing.
In iParadigms, the plaintiffs were four high school students in school
districts in Virginia and Arizona who were required as part of their course to
register and submit works through the popular plagiarism-checking service,
Turnitin, available through the web site turnitin.com. 136 Turnitin is a system
that compares a student work to content available on the Internet and also works
previously submitted to the Turnitin program. 37 When submitting a work in
fulfillment of their course requirements, students must read a user agreement
and click "I Agree" before the work is accepted into the Turnitin database.1 38
The click-through license includes a representation that the student licenses
Turnitin to retain a copy of the student work in the database for future plagiar-
ism checks. 139 If such a future plagiarism check finds that the new turned-in
paper is similar to the prior work, the prior work is referenced in an "Originality
Report" and made available for the alleged plagiarist's teacher to view. 40
In an attempt to avoid the requirement of an archival copy in the Turni-
tin database, the plaintiffs included bold disclaimers on the face of their submit-
ted papers, claiming that they did not consent to the archival of their works by
Turnitin.1 41 The service ignored the disclaimers and archived the papers any-
way, which prompted the plaintiffs to file a suit for copyright infringement. 
142
iParadigms responded with a defense of copyright fair use and with counter-
claims, including contractual indemnification, trespass to chattels, and violation
135 544 F.Supp.2d 473 (EDVa. 2008).
136 Id. at 478.
137 Id. at 477 78.
138 Id. at 478.
139 Id. The average daily submission of student works to Turnitin numbers around 100,000. Id.
140 iParadigms. 544 F.Supp.2d at 479.
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of two criminal computer fraud statutes. 143 The plaintiffs raised the infancy
doctrine and duress as potential defenses to the counterclaims. 
144
The district court 145 roundly rejected all parties' claims and entered
summary judgment against all claims and counterclaims, but also made findings
relevant to the minor authors, which in fact raise more questions than answers.
A. Copyright Infringement
The court found that it was not possible for iParadigms to infringe the
students' copyrighted work through the doctrine of fair use. The fair use de-
fense requires the court to balance factors of the purpose and character of the
infringing use, the nature of the copyrighted work, the amount and substantiality
of the copyrighted work used in the infringing work, and the effect of the in-
fringing use on the market of the copyrighted work to determine whether the use
of the copyrighted work is excused. 46 If a use is fair, it is not an infringement.
The iParadigms court found that the purpose and character of the use of
the students' works was a transformative use from "education and creative ex-
pression" to "an entirely different purpose," although that purpose still used
each student's work in its entirety.' 4  That factor the court explained away by
declaring that it was for comparative use only, providing a "highly beneficial"
service to the public.1 48 The court explained, citing no authority, the creative
nature of the students' copyrighted work weighed neither for nor against a find-
ing of fair use, because the infringing use was comparative only. 149 Finally, the
court found that any perceived economic effect was merely speculative at
best 5 - failing to acknowledge that any argument for an anticipated effect on
the marketplace is by its nature speculative at best.' 5
The court cited little authority for its rewriting of the four factors, and
placed much weight on the academic setting for its interpretation of each of the
143 The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(5)(A)(iii), (a)(5)(B)(i); Virginia
Computer Crimes Act, VA. CODE ANN. § § 18.2-152.3, 18.2-152.6 (2005).
144 A.V. v. iParadigms, 544 F.Supp.2d 473. 480 81 (E.D.Va. 2008).
145 Judge Claude M. Hilton. Interestingly, before being appointed to the bench, Judge Hilton
was a member of a board of education. ALMANAC OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, VOL. 1, 4TH CIR.,
68-69 (Aspen 2009).
146 17 U.S.C. § 107.
147 iParadigms. 544 F.Supp.2d at 482.
148 Id. at 483.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 484.
151 Notes Michael G. Bennett, the plaintiffs had no choice but to take the "comically awkward
position of having their strongest claim to negative market impact be based on their inability...
to sell their works to an on-line student paper mill that would go on to re-sell the works to other
high school students." Michael G. Bennett, The Edge of Ethics in iParadigms, 2009 B.C. INTELL.
PROP. & TECH. F. 100601, at *12.
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four factors that there was no copyright infringement. However, this interpreta-
tion diminishes the value of a copyright that the students have by suggesting that
if students create works in an academic setting, because the works were au-
thored by students in their capacity as students, any secondary use is more likely
to be fair. Although the Internet has substituted school as the primary genesis
of copyrightable works for young authors, it still suggests a condescending dis-
regard for works authored by minor authors.
B. Infancy Doctrine
The court also found that although the students had attempted to disaf-
firm their contracts pursuant to the doctrine of infancy, they had received a ben-
efit from the ability to submit their papers to Turnitin.15 The court defined the
benefit as twofold. The first benefit was the "grade from their teachers, allow-
ing them the opportunity to maintain good standing in the classes in which they
were enrolled." 153 Second, the benefit was "the benefit of standing" to bring the
lawsuit, a benefit which would not be returnable if the infancy defense were in
fact to be revoked. 54 Those benefits, reasoned the court, removed from the
students the ability to disaffirm the contracts, because "he cannot take the bene-
fit of the contract without the burden of the conditions or stipulations." 
155
Before considering the merit of the identified "benefits" of the contract,
it is necessary to realize exactly what the bargain is. Before the student can get
into the site to upload his paper, the student has to click through the agreement
that agrees that iParadigms can keep an archival copy to be searched through
turnitin.com in the future. As a result, the exchange is the ability to upload a
paper for a grade, for the benefit of the student, for an ongoing license to the
student's copyright in the work, for the benefit of iParadigms.
The two "benefits" are nothing of the sort, and create serious implica-
tions if they could be construed as such. First, it is nonsensical to state that a
benefit of a contract can be the standing to bring a lawsuit (and indeed, the court
cites no authority for this statement). Had the students attempted to bring a law-
152 iParadigms. 544 F. Supp. 2d at 481 (quoting LORD, supra note 11. at § 9.14, p. 126). The
court's use of this language is suspect. however. The quotation begins. "If an infant enters into
any contract subject to conditions or stipulations, the minor cannot take the benefit of the contract
without the burden of the conditions or stipulations." LORD, supra note 11, at § 9.14, p. 126
(emphasis added). A "condition" or a "stipulation" is a qualification, restriction, or limitation
modifying the original act with which it is connected; an event, fact, or the like that is necessary to
the occurrence of some other, though not its cause; a prerequisite." BLACK'S, supra note 35, at
333. The court fails to state what the "condition" or the "stipulation" of the iParadigms contract
is, apart from the uploading of the paper the bargained-for burden.
153 iParadignms, 544 F. Supp. 2d at 481.
154 Id.
155 Id. This conclusion was noted by the Fourth Circuit on appeal, but the Fourth Circuit de-
clined to address it in its opinion, despite being asked to by the appellants. See iParadigms. 562
F.3d at 636 n.5.
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suit based on breach of the contract and, then, attempted to avoid the contract
only as a defense to the counterclaim, logically the students would be estopped
from relying on the contract for a right to relief and in the same lawsuit claiming
that the contract is void. However, a case grounded in copyright infringement,
as this case is, is completely consistent with the notion that the contract between
the students and iParadigms was void ab initio, because any reproduction of the
material supposedly contracted for would constitute an infringement.
The idea that standing to sue may be a "benefit" of the contract raises
questions about whether implementing the doctrine of infancy may simply give
way to an infant's quasi-contractual obligations to avoid the unjust enrichment
of a party contracting with the infant. This is true of the idea of necessaries. As
Williston notes:
An infant may make himself liable for goods that are necessary,
considering his position and station in life. This liability,
though often treated as arising from the promise of the infant, is
in reality a quasicontractual obligation . . . . If the minor
chooses not to disaffirm the contract, or, after reaching majority
to ratify it it [sic], she may do so, both when necessaries are the
subject of the contract and when they are not. What is really
meant then by saying that the minor is liable only quasicontrac-
tually for necessaries is that he may avoid his contracts to pay
for necessaries just as he may avoid other contracts, but that if
he does so, as quasi-contractual liability will be imposed upon
him by the law which liability he cannot avoid. 1
5 6
"Necessaries" do not include "standing to sue," and it is implausible
that the standing to sue can be part of the consideration resulting from the bar-
gain between parties; implicit in the formation of a contract is the ability of the
parties to sue for its breach. 157 The language of "benefit" and "burden" suggests
the doctrine of unjust enrichment, which would require a benefit conferred upon
the infant by the plaintiff, an appreciation or knowledge by the infant of the
benefit, and the acceptance or retention by the infant of the benefit under such
circumstances as to make it inequitable for the infant to retain the benefit with-
out the payment of its value. 58 However, it is clear that doctrinally, standing
has never been included in what is eligible for quasi-contractual relief from in-
fant contractors. Extension of the quasi-contract beyond necessaries all but nul-
lifies the doctrine of infancy.
156 LORD, supra note 11, at § 9:18, pp. 181-83, 188.
157 "The requirement of 'standing' is satisfied if it can be said that the plaintiff has a legally
protectable and tangible interest at stake in the litigation." BLACK'S, supra note 35, at 1536.
158 Id. at 1129 30.
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First, to address the point most relevant to infants, the Turnitin contract
dealt with a service, and not a good.15 9 Because most services do not meet the
category of necessity or other unavoidable contract, courts have allowed minors
to disaffirm their contracts for services.1 60 The extension of this doctrine in this
instance requires one of two further clarifications. Either the court intends to
extend the infancy doctrine to services in addition to goods, or, the court is treat-
ing the Turnitin service as a good. Treating web services as goods could create
interesting questions, such as the implication in trade.
Perhaps more notably, however, the court emphasized and identified the
benefit that was conferred upon the students - the grade that the students re-
ceived from the course. This "benefit" was in itself flawed in two distinct ways.
First, the benefit was not derived from Turnitin, the party to the contract that the
students were attempting to disaffirm. Instead, this "benefit" was conferred by
the school the students attended and by the specific instructor who graded the
students. Because the power of disaffirmance is personal to the minor or his
legal representatives, third party beneficiaries of contracts are not permitted to
disaffirm contracts entered into by minors, even though the minors' infancy
could render the contract voidable or invalid. 16 1 It seems incongruous that the
supposed benefit of a contract the minor is supposed to receive is in fact permit-
ted to be bestowed by a party who has no power over the contract between the
parties to it.
The second question is how precisely to quantify the benefit conferred
by a clickwrap agreement that merely permits the user to post to a certain web
site. Monetarily, the user may receive no benefit. The user may find ease of
communication with Facebook, or substantially cut down on distribution costs
by posting to a site. However, the required license or temporary suspension of
rights seems like a disproportionate price to pay where the only cost a site has in
distributing the material is wholly not dependent upon whether the user has any
content posted thereon. Quantification of this benefit and its practical effect
could influence other tests involving online distribution such as fair use and
even infringement. 162 However, the iParadigns court paradoxically refused to
159 Even the home page ofturnitin.com indicates that Turnitin is in fact a service. See Turnitin,
http://www.turnitin.com/static/index.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2009).
160 See, e.g., Berg v. Traylor. 148 Cal. App. 4th 809. 818 (2d Dist. 2007) ("As a general propo-
sition, parental consent is required for the provision of services to minors for the simple reason
that minors may disaffirm their own contracts to acquire such services." (quoting Ballard v. An-
derson, 4 Cal. 3d 873, 878 (1971))).
16 LORD, supra note 11. at § 9:10. pp. 88 90. This has been codified in several states. See, e.g.,
CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 34, 35 (West 1987); GA. CODE ANN. § 13-5-3 (1933); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-
103 (1972); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-1-304 (1997); OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 19 (1972); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 26-2-6 (1972); see also Harris v. Ward, 224 So. 2d 517 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1969) (holding a sale may not be held invalid as to the plaintiff who was neither a party to the
contract nor an assignee of the rights of the minor).
162 For example, the first fair use factor is the purpose and character of the allegedly infringing
use. 17 U.S.C. § 107. This factor often looks at whether the work is commercial or noncommer-
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acknowledge this benefit when considering whether or not there would be an
effect on the marketplace for the students' works.
VI. A SOLUTION
In light of the court's decision in A. V v. iParadigms, it is clear that in
the wrong context the infancy doctrine could be little more than a speed bump
for the party contracting with the minor to overcome. The iParadigms court
may have reached the right conclusion due to the bad-actor status of the minor
authors - in this case involving cheating and plagiarism, it is difficult to see
what objection the minors would have to the archiving of their works, unless
they believed that future submitted works would be flagged because they raised
alarming similarity to their works.1 63 Applied in a different context, however,
the minor author could be left without recourse upon discovering the number
and nature of the rights that the author has unknowingly licensed away. This
opinion is worrisome, as it highlights the error in relying on a doctrine that few
are willing to apply. 164
Part of the underlying problem in relying on the doctrine of infancy to
save infant authors from the contracts which they enter into restricting or allow-
ing the dissemination of their copyrighted works is the lack of a clearer directive
about its application. Although the doctrine in principle may be exactly what is
necessary to help these young authors, in practice, it is housed in the codes of
fifty separate governing entities, each of which must be construed differently
when applied to the rights created by Congress. As a result, the only considera-
tion of this issue will come from courts where underage copyright owners are
able to use their infancy as a defense because in itself, infancy has been held not
to be a viable cause of action.
The failsafe solution, then, is for Congress to address the question of
contracts involving minors, incorporating portions into the Copyright Act. The
traditional governance of the laws of contract by the states has not prevented
Congress from addressing certain contractual problems within the Copyright
Act. In fact, Congress may already have the framework for some relief in the
Act in the form of § 203. As noted above, § 203 of the Copyright Act provides
for the outright termination of transfers of copyright by the author, effecting the
cial in nature. If distribution online were to be a quantifiable benefit to the alleged infringer, uses
that previously have been deemed noncommercial in nature and more likely to be considered a
fair use of a copyrighted work could be found to confer a commercial benefit upon the user, mak-
ing almost all unlicensed online uses of copyrighted works unfair under § 107.
163 In other words, it is most likely conceivable that the teen authors wished to sell their works
to underclassmen for use in future classes.
164 The author is aware that as precedent, this District Court opinion is less likely to be afforded
precedential value than those of its appellate counterparts. However, because the doctrine of
infancy has few modern decisions on which to rely, the persuasive value of every holding increas-
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rights' return back to the author. 165 However, the section provides that the trans-
fer must be terminated within a five-year window thirty-five years after the ex-
ecution of the transfer.166 As a result, transfers and licenses involving an author
who would invoke the doctrine of infancy to invalidate them are necessarily
excluded; the contracting infant must seek to invalidate the contract during their
infancy or soon thereafter,' 61 making the realistic time lapse considerably less
than twenty years.
One straightforward way to incorporate the doctrine of infancy into the
Copyright Act is merely to add the possibility of infant invalidation directly into
§ 203. In addition to the possibility of termination of transfer or license thirty-
five years after the execution of a contract, Congress could provide for the ter-
mination of transfer or license within a five-year window after the execution of
the transfer, if the author has not yet reached the age of majority, or within five
years of the author's attaining the age of majority if the author would not in fact
attain that age within the five-year period. 168 To avoid the bad-faith situation
presented in A. V v. iParadigms, the author would have to sign a statement to
the effect that the termination was not being made for any improper purpose -
a statement that, if successfully challenged, would amount to fraud on the Copy-
right Office with the possibility of penalty.
Of the remaining provisions of § 203, only one would have to be
amended because it does not go far enough to protect minors in a similar trans-
fer termination. Under § 203(b)(1), authors of derivative works prepared pur-
suant to the grant prior to its termination may continue to use those derivative
works. In order to reflect the infancy doctrine, an amendment to § 203 could
not permit this to continue. The distinction is warranted for two reasons. First,
if derivative works are not permitted, then § 203 would act more as an invalida-
tion of the contract - similar to what the infant would be able to achieve under
the traditional doctrine of infancy. Second, the difference in the timing of inva-
lidating an infant's transfer (which could occur in as little as one year within the
execution of the grant) renders it less likely that derivative works would have
been created in that time span.
Such a solution is not contrary to the purpose of § 203. According to the
Notes of Committee on Judiciary, the law was intended to safeguard authors
"against unremunerative transfers." '169 The Committee noted that the law was
necessary "because of the unequal bargaining position of authors, resulting in
165 17 U.S.C. § 203(b). The termination of transfers also applies to other rights-holders, though
it seems likely that most minors discussed in this Article would not have engineered multiple
licenses or transfers at this point in their careers.
166 Id. § 203(a)(3). Or. if the grant covers the publication of the work, any time during a five-
year window beginning at the earlier of thirty-five years from the date of publication or forty years
from the date of execution of the grant.
167 See LoRD. supra note 11. at § 9.14, p. 126.
168 See Appendix A infra.
169 See 17 U.S.C. § 203 (citing H.R. Report No. 94-1476).
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part from the impossibility of determining a work's value until it has been ex-
ploited," and found that § 203 "reflects a practical compromise that will further
the objectives of the copyright law while recognizing the problems and legiti-
mate needs of all interests involved." 170 The extension of § 203 to infant con-
tracts is natural. Largely, contracts that infant authors would enter into have the
possibility of being unremunerative or underremunerative, and the authors defi-
nitely suffer from an unequal bargaining power when faced with the contracts of
large corporations. And, the compromise that can be achieved with the addition
of a half a paragraph to § 203(a)(3) has the potential to further the objectives not
only of copyright law but also of the doctrine of infancy, without tampering
with the defensive mechanism as it exists in most states.
Insofar as state laws are concerned, incorporating the doctrine of infan-
cy into the Copyright Act would solve two problems. First, as discussed above,
typically, while the Copyright Act preempts coexisting state law rights, it has
been held not to preempt most rights based in contract. 171 This is because most
rights conferrable by contract are not squarely addressed within the Copyright
Act. § 203, however, has been held to preempt a terminable-at-will contract that
deals with the mode of contracting regarding a grant of copyright. 172 This
precedent would have stare decisis value to apply to all questions arising from §
203, such as whether contracts with infants would be preempted as well.
Second, including the termination of infant contracts within § 203
would eliminate the need to harmonize conflicting state applications of the doc-
trine of infancy, at least as far as copyright is concerned. Relatively few discre-
pancies exist among state laws with respect to the doctrine of infancy, but some
exist. California offers one of the most protective laws with respect to minors in
the entertainment industry, 173 but it does not directly address any copyrights that
they might own. Under a new § 203, because it would specifically address the
question of copyright ownership, any claims to the contrary would be
preempted, and state laws differing with respect to age of majority would be
deemed irrelevant for copyright purposes.
Two concerns might arise from the amendment of § 203. First, it is dif-
ficult to determine the extent to which terminations under § 203 would be filed,
as well as the administrative costs it would impose upon the Copyright Office.
As it is currently written, § 203 only covers works created on or after January 1,
1978. Because of the mandatory thirty-five year period, therefore, the earliest
that a grant can be terminated under this section is January 1, 2013, so at this
170 Id.
171 See, e.g., ProCd v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1455 (7th Cir. 1996).
172 See Rano v. Sipa Press, Inc., 987 F.2d 580. 585 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding terminable-at-will
licensing agreements for copyrights under California law to be in direct conflict with § 203 and
therefore preempted).
173 See discussion supra.
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point not much discussion has been had about § 203 and its implementation. 174
The first notices of terminations of transfer were thus eligible to be filed on Jan-
uary 1, 2003, but one was not actually filed until August 2004.' 1 As of De-
cember 10, 2009, only ninety-one notices of terminations of transfer had been
filed with the Copyright Office. 176 At an average of about eighteen per year,
then, the costs as thus far established are not high, especially considering that
the Copyright Office plays solely a recording function. However, the urgency
with which minors may wish to retrieve rights could be greater than the urgency
of an estate seeking to recoup rights on behalf of a deceased author, placing
more pressure upon the Copyright Office for expediency.
Moreover, because they are not yet in effect, no terminations have been
tested in the courts, so it is unclear what amount of litigation terminations under
this title will inspire. On January 8, 2010, comics giant Marvel Entertainment
sued the heirs of cartoonist Jack Kirby for exercising the termination of transfer
rights with respect to the copyrights in various franchises such as X-Men, The
Fantastic Four, Spider-Man and The Incredible Hulk. 177 The heirs filed notices
of terminations of transfer September 16, 2009, for a copyright transfer granted
in 1972. 178 The litigation, which appears to center on whether the Kirby works
were works-made-for-hire, 179 may provide a barometer to determine the litiga-
tion costs that terminations of transfer will ultimately entail.
The second concern one might have about § 203 is that it treats minors
even more favorably than their adult counterparts who are subject to the same
contracts. In one respect, this is the purpose behind the infancy doctrine; adults
who would be subject to the identical contractual terms and conditions would be
forced to comply with their requirements, whereas their contracting underage
174 However, there have been discussion concerning and cases interpreting 17 U.S.C. § 304,
which covers transfers of works under the 1909 Copyright Act. This Article does not suggest
amending that section of the Act, as all works created by minor authors (even assuming creation at
infancy) would not have been created prior to 1991.
175 See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(4)(A) (providing that notice shall not be served upon a transferee, or
recorded with the Copyright Office, more than ten years prior to the termination). The first notice
of transfer was filed August 23, 2004, by the trustee of Ira Gershwin, terminating the transfer of
"'s wonderful & 163 other titles" to Warner/Chappell Music, Inc., effective January 5, 2013.
Copyright Office Record V3514D325 (recorded August 23, 2004).
176 Interestingly and perhaps ironically, one of these terminations is the termination of the
transfer of the copyright in E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts, to Aspen Publishers, Inc., filed by his
widow and surviving children. Copyright Office Record V3560D577 (recorded Feb. 25, 2008).
177 See Erik Larson, Marvel Sues Over Copyright Claims by Artist's Heirs. Bus. WK. (Jan. 8,
2010), available at http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-01-08/marvel-sues-over-copyright-
claims-by-artist-s-heirs-updatel-.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2010). The lawsuit is Marvel World-
wide Inc v. Kirby, 2010-cv-141, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York (Manhattan).
178 Press Release. Nasdaq, Marvel Sues the Children of Legendary Comic Book Creator Jack
Kirby, available at http://www.nasdaq.com/aspx/stock-market-news-
story.aspx?storyid=201001090813 dowj onesdj online000008&title=press-release-marvel-sues-the-
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counterparts would be able to avoid them. However, amending § 203 would
provide an easy exemption for a protected category of authors while permitting
online distributors to continue embedding problematic copyright licenses within
their terms and conditions for authors who may be older by a matter of weeks.
In this respect, the amendment would achieve the primary purpose of § 203 -
"to give authors ... a second chance to market works even after a transfer of
rights has been made" 80 - but would not legislate fair and reasonable practices
for those providing terms and conditions on web sites.
VII. CONCLUSION
Currently, there are very few opportunities to join the discourse about
the infancy doctrine, and even fewer to join in its favor. The trend among scho-
lars for years has been to criticize the doctrine and call for its abolition. Even in
the area of minors online, it is easy to believe that the infancy doctrine has abso-
lutely no applicability due to the relationship the contracting minor most often
has to the copyrighted work. In other words, better-known issues involve child-
ren illegally downloading music or other content, creating unsympathetic bad
actors whom we want to hold accountable for their contracting or infringing
activities online.1 81 This is an aspect shared by the iParadigms case. Practically
speaking, the only rational motivation for teen authors to care whether Turitin
retains a nonexclusive license for their copyrights is for the hopes to keep it
from searching in the future - perhaps after selling a successful paper to a fu-
ture student of the same instructor, or reusing the paper in a collegiate or univer-
sity context. To its credit, the limited license that Turitin retains neither raises
a possibility of infringement based on the Turnitin license nor prevents the au-
thor, in most cases, from capitalizing on his own copyrighted work. If more
online models followed this example, this conversation could be purely academ-
ic.
But when we consider the case of Akiane Kramarik and other child art-
ists and authors who merely want to distribute or display online works, it be-
comes easier to see why we should preserve this doctrine or at least implement
some workings of it into the Copyright Act. The flaws apparent in the licenses
running to the web sites from the child authors are indicative of flaws apparent
in all terms and conditions automatically licensing copyrighted content of work.
By highlighting and addressing this problem with respect to children, it is possi-
ble that a way to resolve the problems inherent in site terms and conditions can
be illuminated.
180 Walthal v. Rusk, 172 F.3d 481. 484 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding that § 203 did not prevent a
termination of an agreement pursuant to contract law).
181 See, e.g., Daniel, supra note 49; Bowie & Jensen, LLC, The (Unanticipated) Costs of Child
Rearing, LEGALEASE NEWSLETTER (Vol. 7, Issue 2. Apr. 8. 2009), available at http://www.bowie-
jensen.com/News/NewslettersArchive/Vol7issue2/art04_ParentalLiability.html (last visited Jan.
12, 2010) (discussing costs of parental secondary liability for child infringement cases).
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The wolf also shall dwell with the lamb, and the leopard shall
lie down with the kid; and the calf and the young lion and the
fatling together; and a little child shall lead them.
- The Holy Bible, Isaiah 1 1:68 2
182 Isaiah 11:6 (King James).
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APPENDIX A
§ 203 Termination of transfers and licenses granted by the author [suggested
revision]
(a) Conditions for Termination. - In the case of any work other than a
work made for hire, the exclusive or nonexclusive grant of a transfer or license
of copyright or of any right under a copyright, executed by the author on or
after January 1, 1978, otherwise than by will, is subject to termination under the
following conditions:
(1) In the case of a grant executed by one author, termination of
the grant may be effected by that author or, if the author is dead,
by the person or persons who, under clause (2) of this subsec-
tion, own and are entitled to exercise a total of more than one-
half of that author's termination interest. In the case of a grant
executed by two or more authors of a joint work, termination of
the grant may be effected by a majority of the authors who ex-
ecuted it; if any of such authors is dead, the termination interest
of any such author may be exercised as a unit by the person or
persons who, under clause (2) of this subsection, own and are
entitled to exercise a total of more than one-half of that author's
interest.
(2) Where an author is dead, his or her termination interest is
owned, and may be exercised, as follows:
(A) The widow or widower owns the author's entire termi-
nation interest unless there are any surviving children or
grandchildren of the author, in which case the widow or wi-
dower owns one-half of the author's interest.
(B) The author's surviving children, and the surviving
children of any dead child of the author, own the author's
entire termination interest unless there is a widow or wi-
dower, in which case the ownership of one-half of the au-
thor's interest is divided among them.
(C) The rights of the author's children and grandchildren
are in all cases divided among them and exercised on a per
stirpes basis according to the number of such author's child-
ren represented; the share of the children of a dead child in
a termination interest can be exercised only by the action of
a majority of them.
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(D) In the event that the author's widow or widower, child-
ren, and grandchildren are not living, the author's executor,
administrator, personal representative, or trustee shall own
the author's entire termination interest.
(3) Termination of the grant may be effected as follows:
(A) At any time during a period of five years beginning at
the end of thirty-five years from the date of execution of the
grant; or, if the grant covers the right of publication of the
work, the period begins at the end of thirty-five years from
the date of publication of the work under the grant or at the
end of forty years from the date of execution of the grant,
whichever term ends earlier;
(B) If the author has not yet attained eighteen years of age,
at any time during a period of five years from the date of
the execution of the grant; or, if the author will not attain
eighteen years of age within five years from the date of the
execution of the grant, within five years of the author's
eighteenth birthday.
(4) The termination shall be effected by serving an advance no-
tice in writing, signed by the number and proportion of owners
of termination interests required under clauses (1) and (2) of
this subsection, or by their duly authorized agents, upon the
grantee or the grantee's successor in title.
(A) The notice shall state the effective date of the termina-
tion, which shall fall within the five-year period specified
by clause (3) of this subsection, and the notice shall be
served not less than two or more than ten years before that
date. A copy of the notice shall be recorded in the Copy-
right Office before the effective date of termination, as a
condition to its taking effect.
(B) The notice shall comply, in form, content, and manner
of service, with requirements that the Register of Copy-
rights shall prescribe by regulation.
(5) Termination of the grant may be effected notwithstanding
any agreement to the contrary, including an agreement to make
a will or to make any future grant.
(b) Effect of Termination. - Upon the effective date of termination, all
rights under this title that were covered by the terminated grants revert to the
2010]
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author, authors, and other persons owning termination interests under clauses
(1) and (2) of subsection (a), including those owners who did not join in signing
the notice of termination under clause (4) of subsection (a), but with the follow-
ing limitations:
(1) If termination is effected pursuant to section (a)(3)(A)
above,a derivative work prepared under authority of the grant
before its termination may continue to be utilized under the
terms of the grant after its termination, but this privilege does
not extend to the preparation after the termination of other de-
rivative works based upon the copyrighted work covered by the
terminated grant.
(2) The future rights that will revert upon termination of the
grant become vested on the date the notice of termination has
been served as provided by clause (4) of subsection (a). The
rights vest in the author, authors, and other persons named in,
and in the proportionate shares provided by, clauses (1) and (2)
of subsection (a).
(3) Subject to the provisions of clause (4) of this subsection, a
further grant, or agreement to make a further grant, of any right
covered by a terminated grant is valid only if it is signed by the
same number and proportion of the owners, in whom the right
has vested under clause (2) of this subsection, as are required to
terminate the grant under clauses (1) and (2) of subsection (a).
Such further grant or agreement is effective with respect to all
of the persons in whom the right it covers has vested under
clause (2) of this subsection, including those who did not join in
signing it. If any person dies after rights under a terminated
grant have vested in him or her, that person's legal representa-
tives, legatees, or heirs at law represent him or her for purposes
of this clause.
(4) A further grant, or agreement to make a further grant, of any
right covered by a terminated grant is valid only if it is made af-
ter the effective date of the termination. As an exception, how-
ever, an agreement for such a further grant may be made be-
tween the persons provided by clause (3) of this subsection and
the original grantee or such grantee's successor in title, after the
notice of termination has been served as provided by clause (4)
of subsection (a).
(5) Termination of a grant under this section affects only those
rights covered by the grants that arise under this title, and in no
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way affects rights arising under any other Federal, State, or for-
eign laws.
(6) Unless and until termination is effected under this section,
the grant, if it does not provide otherwise, continues in effect
for the term of copyright provided by this title.
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